A fatal medication error

A 75-year-old woman died at Vanderbilt University Medical Center after receiving intravenous vecuronium, a drug that causes muscle paralysis, instead of Versed, a sedative.

Here’s what happened.

She had been recovering well from an intraparenchymal brain hematoma after a fall. While awaiting a full body positron emission tomography (PET) scan in the radiology department, the patient said she was anxious about being in the machine because she was claustrophobic.

A doctor ordered Versed 2 mg IV in the electronic medical record at 2:47 PM. Two minutes later, the pharmacy verified the order. The radiology department staff said they could not give the medication because they were very busy and the patient would need to be monitored.

So nurse A, who was functioning as the “help all” nurse was asked by the patient’s nurse, nurse B, to go to radiology and give the medication. At 2:59 PM, nurse A went to the automated dispensing cabinet (ADC) and searched for Versed in the patient’s profile. When she couldn’t find the drug listed, she selected the “override” setting to search for the drug. She entered the first two letters of the drug, VE, and clicked on the first medication that popped up.

How does a 16-year-old boy receive 38 times the normal dose of an antibiotic?

If you are a doctor, nurse, patient, or just someone interested in patient safety, you should read a five-part story called "The Overdose: Harm in a Wired Hospital" excerpted from a book "The Digital Doctor" by Dr. Robert Wachter.

Dr. Wachter and the hospital are to be commended for publicizing this incident so others may learn from it. The hospital staff, the patient, and his mother, also deserve credit for allowing their stories to be told.

A synopsis does not do justice to this well-written account of the boy's near-death experience in a top hospital in San Francisco. In short, he somehow received a massive overdose of the antibiotic Septra despite the presence of a sophisticated electronic medical record and multiple systems in place that were supposed to prevent such a thing from happening.

After the patient recovered from receiving 38½ pills when he should have been given only one, a root cause analysis found numerous faulty system issues such as an electronic ordering program that was overly complex, a nurse "floating" to an unfamiliar floor, a satellite pharmacy that was too busy and susceptible to distractions, "alert fatigue" among hospital staff, and a culture, like that of most hospitals, that may have discouraged questioning both authority and the almighty computer.

Follow-up: Meaningful Use Stage 3 is coming

Yesterday, I posted "Meaningful Use Stage 3 Is Coming: Should Be Fun" which discussed some onerous new rules that Stage 3 will impose including this one:

More than 25% of patients seen by an eligible professional (EP) or discharged from a hospital or emergency department (ED) must "actively engage" with their electronic health records (EHRs).

I said that in my experience most of the patients I took care of would have been unlikely to engage their EHRs and expressed concern that physicians would be penalized for their patients not reaching the 25% threshold.

A reader commented that the VA has had a patient portal called the Blue Button since 2010. He pointed out that in May of 2012, more than 500,000 unique patients had accessed their EMR. He meant this as a rebuttal to my opinion about the potential level of engagement.

However, it turns out that in 2012 over 6.3 million patients were treated by the VA system.  [See page 4 of this link.] If you divide 1 million by 6.3 million, you get 15.9%.

It seems like they have quite a way to go to get to 25%

I rest my case.

German airliner crash: A system error with a system solution?

From the Associated Press: Airlines around the world on Thursday began requiring two crew members to always be present in the cockpit, after details emerged that the co-pilot of Germanwings Flight 9525 had apparently locked himself in the cockpit and deliberately crashed the plane into the mountains below.

This represents an organization's typical response to a problem. The crash, which by all accounts was caused by a single deranged individual, has been perceived as the result of a “system error” and will be dealt with as such.

The idea that a flight attendant going into the cockpit whenever one of the pilots has to pee will prevent anything seems a bit absurd to me. How is a 5’2” 120 pound female flight attendant supposed to stop a 6’3” 210 pound pilot who is hell-bent on committing suicide by airplane?

When I tweeted a similar thought yesterday, someone suggested that she could simply sound an alarm and unlock the cockpit door. I suppose that’s true as long as the crazed pilot does not punch her in the face and knock her out or shoot her first.

Meaningful Use Stage 3 Is Coming: Should Be Fun

An alert reader tipped me off to something many of you may not be aware of. Stage 3 of Meaningful Use is close at hand.

The "proposed" rules will be officially published on March 30. The good news is that comments will be received for a couple of months.

The bad news is that if the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology is anything like every other regulatory body I've ever dealt with [e,g., the ACGME's Residency Review Committee for Surgery], the "proposed" rules will be the real rules and the comments will be simply a way for disgruntled physicians to vent.

If you don't believe me about the venting, take a look at the 185 mostly negative comments posted on Medscape’s story about Stage 3.

Here are a few of the new rules that will be in effect by 2017 or sooner.

Patient falls off OR table: System error or human error?

An anesthetized patient fell to the floor headfirst from an operating room table during a laparoscopic appendectomy in Scotland. The table had been tilted into an extreme head down position to facilitate the operation. Fortunately, no injury occurred.

The Edinburgh Evening News account says that there were 10 staff members in the room at the time the case started, but no one had placed a safety restraint on the patient.

A follow -up story noted that the hospital has experienced 11 other major surgical errors in the last year including two instances of wrong-site surgery and a case in which five swabs were left inside a single patient.

An investigation by the hospital noted that the level of situational awareness of the operating room staff was inadequate, and teamwork and communication were poor. In addition, the safety culture within the operating room was described as not highly attuned to patient safety.

The staff was also distracted by mobile phone use and idle chatter.

Instead of addressing the obvious human errors such as failure to place the safety strap, which in US hospitals is clearly the duty of the circulating nurse, the hospital's plan of correction focused on the following typical system-type corrections:

• Compulsory training of 1200 staff. Although there were 10 staff for a laparoscopic appendectomy (in the US there would be 4, nurse, scrub tech, surgeon, anesthesiologist), I doubt that there are 1200 people working in the operating room of this 570-bed hospital. What will those not working in the OR have to gain from compulsory training? I wonder if anyone considered that 10 staff for an appendectomy is far too many, and that's why there was a lot of idle chatter. Six of the staff had nothing to do until the patient needed to be picked up off the floor.

• A ban on talking at key times during operations. This one will be hard to enforce. Who decides what the key times are? I also don't see what it had to do with the incident since tilting the table would not be considered a key time in the case.

• Daily meetings to improve patient safety. Good luck with that. What on earth are they going to discuss at daily meetings to improve patient safety? I predict that those meetings won't take place for more than 3 or 4 weeks.

• Sanctions for staff who fail to meet the new standards. Also be hard to enforce. How will this be judged?

I would have talked with the nursing staff and asked them whose job it was to place the safety strap. If you want to make a system change, why not clearly specify which staff member is responsible for that action? And how about using a checklist?

Five years ago, the Scottish Patient Safety Program recommended using pre-surgery meetings and checklists to protect patients. The investigation showed that in this hospital, checklists were completed about 10% of the time and often not properly. The staff claimed that they didn't have time to do the checklists. Ten people in the room for an appendectomy and no one has time to complete a checklist?

Next I would have asked the anesthesiologist where he was. Usually the job of adjusting the table is his, and the controls are at the head of the bed. He should have noticed the patient was beginning to slide off the table and intervened.

Finally I would have asked the surgeon just how much head down tilt he needed. I have never even come close to having a patient more than about 30 degrees of head down during a laparoscopic appendectomy.

Patient falling from an OR table—human error.

Wrong site surgery—human error.

Leaving foreign objects inside patients—human error.

The OR staff of every hospital counts instruments and swabs. Wrong-site surgery is 100% avoidable. This hospital had a number of appropriate systems in place. The staff simply disregarded them. Creating more meetings and rules that are unlikely to be followed or make a difference will not solve the problem of a staff with a "can't do" attitude.

9-year-old boy flies to Vegas without a ticket. System error or human error?

Last week, a 9-year-old boy managed to fly from Minneapolis to Las Vegas by himself without a ticket on Delta Airlines.

According to a CNN report, Delta is reviewing its "policies and procedures to make sure something like this does not happen again." This is the predictable response by most organizations when a screw-up occurs.

Do you think this was a system error or a human error?

I favor the latter. And the errors weren't confined only to Delta employees.

How many people had to have not followed established procedures for the child to have pulled this off?

At most airports, you can't even enter the security line without showing your boarding pass and ID. Children under 18 are not required to carry identification, but someone from the TSA had to have overlooked the fact that the boy had no boarding pass to scribble on.

Another possible check might have occurred as he passed through the metal detector by himself.

At the gate when boarding starts, an agent either marks each boarding pass or scans its bar code to tally the number of passengers on board. Obviously, the boy didn't have a pass so that did not happen.

Once he got on the plane, he had to have picked a seat at random. He would not have known which seats were unassigned. It is highly likely that he had to change seats at least once or twice. Again no one noticed that he didn't have a boarding pass.

The story says the flight crew became suspicious when the plane was in the air. They eventually noticed that he was an accompanied minor that they had not been made aware of.

What happened to the head count prior to closing the door? Most flights I've been on do not leave the gate until the flight attendants have walked through the cabin and counted the number of seated passengers.

Rather than a review of policies and procedures, the airline and the TSA should "counsel" the personnel involved in this event.

For other examples of human errors being thought of as system errors, type "system errors" in the search field of this blog.

A prank in the OR backfires

An anesthesiologist at a California hospital pasted stickers simulating a mustache and teardrops on the face of a hospital employee while she was having surgery on a finger.

According to the LA Times, the doctor said, "I thought she would think this is funny and she would appreciate it."

And if that wasn't bad enough, a "nursing attendant" took a photograph.

The patient, who said she had to quit her job because of the humiliation, is suing the hospital and the physician for this confidentiality breach.

The woman who took the photo said she deleted it after showing it to the patient and didn't post it anywhere. One version of the story is that she texted the photo to the plaintiff.

Others have testified that they saw the image on Facebook although the hospital said that there is no proof the photo was ever posted online. Multiple news outlets, including the LA Times, have published the photo which was obtained via court documents. 

One thing is certain. The photo is readily available now.

The plaintiff also claims that general anesthesia was unnecessary and only used so that the picture could be taken.

The anesthesiologist and some hospital employees were disciplined, but the hospital says the patient has fabricated and exaggerated some of her complaints.

At a deposition, a nurse manager at the hospital testified that in 2009, a sales representative took some pictures of a naked patient in the operating room. The hospital maintained that no such photos were ever taken. But then not only barred that sales rep from its OR, it also established a policy that no cell phones or cameras would be permitted in that area. This was an attempt to rectify a human error in judgment and common sense with a system correction. Obviously, it didn't work.

There are lots of issues to discuss.

It seems the OR is not a good place for a prank.

Bad ideas. One, pasting the stickers on the patient. Two, taking a photo (without consent). Three, texting it to the plaintiff. Four, posting it on Facebook (allegedly).

The Internet doesn't forget. Once something is posted it tends to stay there—somewhere—forever.

There is this thing called HIPAA, which contains many strict rules about patient privacy. People have been fired, fined, and even jailed for breaches of patient privacy.

Why didn't the hospital settle this case, which has gone viral? Do they really think they can win? Have they never heard of the "Streisand Effect"?

The hospital had a policy of no cell phones and no photos in the OR, but it was observed about as well as the 55 MPH speed limit. 

If there is nothing else to learn from this case, a hospital should not establish policies it cannot or will not enforce. Lawyers feast on that sort of thing.

Bottom line: The cell phone and its camera are not the culprits here. Smartphones don't take pictures of people; people take pictures of people.

"System errors" plague the NTSB and a San Francisco TV station

By now you have probably heard about the San Francisco TV station that broadcast what it thought were the names of the four pilots of Asiana Flight 214 that crashed landed last week.

The names were not those of the pilots and were typical racist stereotypes.

If you haven't seen it, here's a 30 second clip that shows all you need to know.

The station, of course, apologized and said that it had confirmed the names with the National Transportation Safety Board, which promptly blamed a "summer intern" for the debacle. This is according to an NBC News/Reuters story, one of the very few that didn't repeat the names.

That story also points out that the real names of the two pilots at the controls had been released earlier in the week.

Is another case of system errors and not human errors? Let's see.

The NTSB said, "Appropriate actions will be taken to ensure that such a serious error is not repeated." The intern was supposed to have referred such questions to official NTSB media people.

The station's vice president and general manager said, "Nothing is more important to us than having the highest level of accuracy and integrity, and we are reviewing our procedures to ensure this type of error does not happen again."

The apparently clueless anchorwoman who read the names has said, "A serious mistake was made."

Here is what spokespeople for the Asian American Journalists Association had to offer, "We are embarrassed for the anchor, who was as much a victim as KTVU's viewers and KTVU's hard-working staff."

Wait a sec. The anchor and KTVU's hard-working staff were victims?

"We never read the names out loud, phonetically sounding them out," said a different KTVU anchor.

Another AAJA member wrote, "Common sense indicates that simply sounding out the names would have raised red flags,"

Sound out the names? They were so obviously fake that a high school kid would have noticed simply by silently reading them.

How could everyone at the TV station, the producers, editors, writers and the anchor who read the story on the air with a straight face, not have noticed that the names were not only not very plausible, but also exceedingly offensive?

Also unclear is how the station acquired the supposed names in the first place.

System errors? I don't think so.

Additional source: Los Angeles Times

Search "System Errors" on my blog to see 12 other posts on this topic.

Pregnant woman dies after ovary removed instead of appendix

On June 10, 2013 a 32-year-old "heavily" pregnant woman was reported to have died after having an ovary removed instead of her inflamed appendix. As the infected appendix festered, she became septic and succumbed to multiple organ failure. This tragedy occurred in the UK in late 2011, but has just come to light.

How could this have happened?

Let me count the ways.

The surgery was performed by two trainee surgeons. Their level of experience was not stated.

The senior staff, called consultants in the UK, had gone home for the day.

The operation to remove the appendix was apparently done as an open procedure, not laparoscopic, which is acceptable if done correctly. The articles say that the surgeons had to take out the organ by feel and not under direct vision, which is not proper.

Although an ovary can be enlarged during pregnancy, under no circumstances does an ovary look or feel like an appendix. As in another case described below, inflammation can cause confusion at times, but not to this degree.

The woman was discharged a week after the initial surgery but returned with pain some 10 days after the removal of the wrong organ. During that time period, no one had checked the pathology report. The mistake was discovered by a doctor reviewing the patient's records during the readmission.

An abscess was drained but the she died on the operating table during a futile attempt to at last remove the appendix.

Last week, the CEO of the hospital sent a written apology to the family promising to correct the dreaded "system errors." Too little, too late.

Yes, there were system errors.

But what about human errors?

Trainees were allowed to undertake a supposedly routine operation without supervision. However, as this case shows, an appendectomy during pregnancy can be very difficult. The uterus is in the way, and its increasing size may displace the appendix from its normal position. This type of surgery cannot be done by "feel" alone.

Commentary from UK physicians on Twitter suggests that all the facts of the case, such as what communications took place between the trainees and their supervisor, have not been made public. They also point out that it is not mandatory for a consultant to be present in the operating room for every case as is true of the resident-attending surgeon relationship in the US.

But I doubt that many US surgeons would allow residents to operate independently on a pregnant patient with appendicitis. At the very least, the attending would have been in the OR, if not scrubbed.

Did the trainees ask the consultant for help when they found themselves doing an appendectomy by feel?

The surgeons did not look at the pathology report, a major omission. But what about the pathologist? If a pathologist receives a specimen labeled "appendix," and he finds only an ovary, wouldn't the prudent pathologist pick up the phone and call the surgeon?

There is also "failure to rescue." When the patient was readmitted, earlier recognition of sepsis and more timely intervention might have saved her life.

I am aware of a similar case in which an inflamed piece of fat was removed by two unsupervised trainees who mistook it for the inflamed appendix. On the following day, the pathologist called the attending surgeon to tell her that the appendix was not present in the specimen. The patient was promptly taken back to surgery. He wasn't too happy, but he was alive.

The hospital's investigation of this case should have taken a few days at most. If the media reports are true, disciplinary measures and remediation should have been promptly instituted. An apology should have been offered far sooner than it was.

“An extensive trust-wide action plan was drawn up following Mrs De Jesus’ death in 2011 to ensure that such a tragic incident will not happen again" and "… to improve systems and patient safety," said the hospital's CEO.

As I have blogged before, system changes can be instituted, but can be defeated easily by carelessness, inattention and lapses of common sense by one or more individuals.

Stories about this from the UK media here and here. Search this blog for "system error" to view other posts on system errors.

ADDENDUM April 15, 2014
For some follow-up on this sad story, click here.